We study the selection of agents based on mutual nominations, a theoretical problem with many applications from committee selection to AI alignment. As agents both select and are selected, they may be incentivized to misrepresent their true opinion about the eligibility of others to influence their own chances of selection. Impartial mechanisms circumvent this issue by guaranteeing that the selection of an agent is independent of the nominations cast by that agent. Previous research has established strong bounds on the performance of impartial mechanisms, measured by their ability to approximate the number of nominations for the most highly nominated agents. We study to what extent the performance of impartial mechanisms can be improved if they are given a prediction of a set of agents receiving a maximum number of nominations. Specifically, we provide bounds on the consistency and robustness of such mechanisms, where consistency measures the performance of the mechanisms when the prediction is accurate and robustness its performance when the prediction is inaccurate. For the general setting where up to k agents are to be selected and agents nominate any number of other agents, we give a mechanism with consistency 1 O 1k and robustness 1 1e O 1k .

The power method is one of the most fundamental tools for extracting top principal components from data through low-rank matrix approximation. Yet, when the target rank is large, the cost of matrix multiplication associated with this procedure becomes a major bottleneck. We develop an algorithmic and theoretical framework for accelerating the power method using fast sketching, which is a popular paradigm in randomized linear algebra. Our framework leads to simple and provably efficient methods for singular value decomposition, low-rank factorization, and Nyström approximation, which attain strong numerical performance on benchmark problems. The key novelty in our analysis is the use of regularized spectral approximation, a property of fast sketching methods which proves more flexible in generalizing power method guarantees than traditional arguments.

Another example is when expected advertising revenue if we set τ = max{f(X): X U}, SCP asks to find the set of minimum size in U that achieves measure how effectively a subset X summarizes the entire dataset U [Tschiatschek et al., 2014].